Table of Contents

CP Core 2

Generic Net Benefits 3

1. Poverty 3

2. Automation (Solves Econ Demand) 3

3. Informal Sector NB (Short) 4

Cap NB 5

Levinas NB 7

1. Totalization 7

2. Codification 7

Frontlines 9

AT Turns 9

AT Not Enough Money/You Give People Money and Take It Right Back: 9

AT People Don’t Work: 10

AT Not Empirically Proven/Doesn’t Solve 11

AT Its Sexist: 11

AT It Worsens Stigma For The Poor: 11

AT Inflation: 12

AT Perms 13

AT UBI For Unemployed: 13

AT Do Both: 13

# CP Core

[Aff actors] will implement a universal basic income and abolish the minimum wage. **Aziz 13[[1]](#footnote-1)**

I propose abolishing the minimum wage, and replacing it with a basic income policy, a version of which was first advocated in America by Thomas Paine. Individuals would be able to work for whatever wage they can secure, meaning that low-skilled individuals — especially the young, who currently face a particularly high rate of unemployment — would have an easier time finding work. And the level of basic income could be tied to the level of productivity, to reduce inequality.¶ There are two kinds of basic income policy. The first is a negative income tax [is] — if an individual’s income level falls beneath a certain threshold (say, $1,500 a month) the government makes up the difference. Funds for this could be accessed by consolidating existing welfare programs like state-run pension schemes and unemployment benefits, and by closing tax loopholes and raising taxes on corporate profits and high-income earners. Germany has [enacted this policy] enacted a similar policy — called the"Kurzabeit" — and it's been credited with shielding the German labor force from the worst of the recession and keeping their unemployment rate low since.¶ The second is a universal income policy, where everyone receives a payment irrespective of their income. This would obviously require more funds — meaning higher taxes — but in a future where corporations are making larger and larger profits while requiring fewer and fewer workers due to automation, such policies may become increasingly feasible. There are already very serious proposals to initiate such a scheme in Switzerland.

**A.** a system of wages no longer exists, so it’s impossible to maintain a system of living wages alongside the CP.

**B.** net benefits – CP alone solves better than the aff, and the perm.

**C.** the basic income does the same thing as the living wage, it’s just not dependent on employment – no net benefit to the perm since it’s the same for recipients

**D.** no aff offense would justify it: living wage gets you to a particular income line, combining that with a basic income wage is just a requirement for twice the living wage line if you’re employed, which doesn’t make sense – the definition of a living wage is determined by what’s necessary to meet your needs

**E.** employment is a disad to the perm – Aziz means that jobs don’t exist otherwise since it’s not worth paying the living wage

Functions as a de facto floor, employers need to make work appealing despite people not being desperate for it. Coopts the entirety of the aff advantages without a requirement on employers. **Yglesias ‘13[[2]](#footnote-2)**

A GBI helps people by giving them money, obviously. It also serves as a kind of de facto minimum wage, since if people can earn money doing nothing, in practice you're going to need to offer them higher pay to get them to work. But it's much more flexible than a minimum wage. In a GBI world, an employer has to make work somehow appealing enough to get employees even though everyone's guaranteed a basic minimum whether they work or not. But that "appealing" factor could be high wages, could be valuable skills and training, could just be a pleasant work atmosphere, or could be some combination of the three. Current minimum wage policies sort of try to achieve these goals by having exemptions for educationally rewarding internships or vocational programs. But these exemptions manage to be simultaneously too prone to abuse and too inflexible to capture the full range of possible scenarios that arise in human life.

## Generic Net Benefits

### 1. Poverty

Living wages won’t solve poverty at all. **Dunkelberg[[3]](#footnote-3)**

*Bracketed for grammar.*

**As a poverty program, raising the** minimum **wage is like killing flies with a shotgun**, not very well targeted.  About **60% of the** officially **poor don’t work,** so the only thing **raising the** minimum **wage** does for them is to **make[s] it harder for them to get a** job if they ever decide they want one.  Workers must bring at least as much value to the firm as they are paid or the firm will fail and all jobs will be lost (no GM bailouts are available to our 6 million small employers that employ half of our private sector workforce).  Raising the minimum wage raises the hurdle a worker must cross to justify being hired. It is estimated that **less than 15% of the total increase in wages resulting from an increase** in the minimum **will go to people below the poverty line** and less than a third of those receiving the minimum wage are families below the poverty line.  **Most minimum wage workers are from above median income families.** So, **most of the people benefiting from the minimum wage are not the intended targets of the “anti-poverty” aspect of raising the** minimum **wage.**

### 2. Automation (Solves Econ Demand)

Automation in the squo means decreasing jobs. **Rotman ’13[[4]](#footnote-4)** summarizes

Given his calm and reasoned academic demeanor, it is easy to miss just how provocative Erik Brynjolfsson’s contention really is. ­Brynjolfsson, a professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management, and his collaborator and coauthor Andrew McAfee have been arguing for the last year and a half that impressive advances in computer technology—from improved industrial robotics to automated translation services—are largely behind the sluggish employment growth of the last 10 to 15 years. Even more ominous for workers, the MIT academics foresee dismal prospects for many types of jobs as these powerful new technologies are increasingly adopted not only in manufacturing, clerical, and retail work but in professions such as law, financial services, education, and medicine. That robots, automation, and software can replace people might seem obvious to anyone who’s worked in automotive manufacturing or as a travel agent. But Brynjolfsson and McAfee’s claim is more troubling and controversial. They believe that rapid technological change has been destroying jobs faster than it is creating them, contributing to the stagnation of median income and the growth of inequality in the United States. And, they suspect, something similar is happening in other technologically advanced countries.

Living wages encourages that to continue: they make it too expensive to hire workers, so people can’t be employed who want to be and would accept less – that’s Aziz. Also guts aff solvency: people won’t have jobs or be receiving wages at all. Basic income solves and controls the internal link to econ: it’s key to avert a demand crisis. **Wells ‘14**[[5]](#footnote-5)

First, the material abundance being wrought by ever increasing automation makes the affordability and sustainability of a universal basic income more credible. The scourge of technological unemployment means that even if being paid a living wage to do nothing does dissuade lots of us from taking jobs and turns us into "surfer bums," that won't affect the tax base - since there will be few jobs left for humans to do anyway. Effects on the work ethic would be irrelevant. Second, because the labour market mechanism for transferring claims on economic output from capital to labour has broken down, we will need a new way of providing people with the ability to consume goods, or else we will end up in an economic crisis of under-consumption amid over-production (such as Marx prophesised). In that case even, the capitalists who own the machines and the algorithms will be less well-off than they could be, for no matter how cheap their goods and services would be to produce, their profits depend on people being able to afford them.

### 3. Informal Sector NB (Short)

Minimum wage causes a shift to the informal sector— takes out your offense since the wages they get decline overall. **Boeri ‘08**[[6]](#footnote-6)

Minimum wages may not have negative effects on employment in dual labor markets where the minimum wage does not apply to the secondary or informal labor market. Under these conditions there are important spillover effects between the two sectors. As pointed out by Gramlich (1976), Mincer (1976) and, Welch (1976), after a minimum wage increase, workers displaced in the formal sector move to the uncovered sector. Hence, as depicted in figure 2.4, wages in the informal sector fall (fromwoI tow1I),and labor supply in the formal sector declines (shifting the Ls curve to the left). The minimum wage then reallocates jobs from the formal to the informal sector, increasing the difference between formal and informal wages. This adjustment mechanism prevents employment losses only insofar as there is perfect labor mobility between the two sectors.

No link to the counterplan though – I don’t raise the minimum wage. Informal sector kills growth, productivity, and competitiveness – turns case and outweighs. **Farrell ‘04**[[7]](#footnote-7)

In Portugal and Turkey, informality accounts for nearly 50 percent of the overall productivity gap with the US. Around the world, these informal players operate at just half the average productivity level of formal companies in the same sectors and at a small fraction of the productivity of the best companies. As a result, informal companies persistently drag down a country's overall productivity and standard of living. MGI's investigation also found that the substantial cost advantage that informal companies gain by avoiding taxes and regulations more than offsets their low productivity and small scale. Competition is therefore distorted because inefficient informal players stay in business and prevent more productive, formal companies from gaining market share. Any short-term employment benefits of informality are thus greatly outweighed by its long-term negative impact on economic growth and job creation.

## Cap NB

A basic income reshapes the labor relation underlying modern biocapitalism – it ends the dominance of employers over workers and the exploitation of common goods – means I solve the cause of AC harms. **Fumagalli[[8]](#footnote-8)**

However, almost all the social partners are opposed to the introduction of basic income. Trade Unions because they have not yet fully imderstood the current transformation of labour and the new mode of valorization, fear the loss of their basis and, above all, are linked to a conception rn of wage labour fundamentally ethical (labour ethic)”. Entrepreneurial associations, unlike the conservative behaviour of most unions, consider the introduction of basic income as potentially dangerous for the maintenance of labour discipline. And, indeed, from their point of view, they have right. The introduction of basic income, in fact, can be considered a potential counter-power, that undermines the current system of subordination and blackmail of the precarious multitude”. In fact, to ensure a stable and continuous income regardless of labour activity, means to reduce[s] the degree of blackmail of workers: a blackmail imposed by contractual individualism and by the need to work for living. Basic income can lead to exercise the “right to choose its own work” (instead of the traditional “right to work”, whatever it may be), an element that could shake the foundations of hierarchical and social control in cognitive bio-capitalism. At the same time, the partial or total removal of income blackmail can potentially foster a process of recomposition of the precarious multitude. We say "potentially" because such recomposition is not automatic but depends on the subjectivity of the involved individuals”. The outcome that would arise in any event linked, in any case, to a less availability to a supine acceptance of any labour conditions. Secondly - and this is even a more important factor, although most misunderstood — basic income presupposes that a proportion (greater or lesser extent) of the social wealth produced by the general intellect and by the structure of cooperative production should return to the same “producers”. This means a reduction in proﬁt margins, arising from the exploitation of social cooperation and common goods, unless immaterial productivity gains, generated by more stable and satisfying income conditions, are not able to compensate for this reduction.

**Outweighs: A.** Minimum wages make the condition of work more palatable but the squo proves that they don’t fundamentally challenge capitalism – the system continues to exist and be exploitive.

**B.** aff benefits are contingent on *employment*, so employers still control access to life-sustainment: no challenge to the balance of power between workers and employers. You revalue people for their productive capacity, but not as people, **Indeed**, the aff’s strategy criminalizes poverty replaces the social state to entrench oppression of unskilled workers – their value is made contingent on productivity. **Wacquant[[9]](#footnote-9)**

The resolutely punitive turn taken by penal policies in advanced societies at the close of the twentieth century thus does not pertain to the simple diptych of “crime and punishment.” It heralds the establishment of a new government of social insecurity, “in the expansive sense of techniques and procedures aimed at directing the conduct of the men”17 and women caught up in the turbulence of economic deregulation and the conversion of welfare into a springboard toward precarious employment, an organizational design within which the prison assumes a major role and which translates, for the groups residing in the nether regions of social space, in the imposition of severe and supercilious supervision. It is the United States that invented this new politics of poverty during the period from 1975 to 1995, in the wake of the social, racial, and statist reaction to the progressive movements of the previous decade that was to be the crucible of the neoliberal revolution.18 This is why this book takes the reader across the Atlantic to probe the entrails of this bulimic penal state that has surged out of the ruins of the charitable state and the big black ghettos. The argumentation unfolds in four movements. The first part (“Poverty of the Socialwelfare State”) shows how the rise of the carceral sector partakes of a broader restructuring of the US bureaucratic field tending to criminalize poverty and its consequences so as to anchor precarious wage work as a new norm of citizenship at the bottom of the class structure while remedying the derailing of the traditional mechanisms for maintaining the ethnoracial order (Chapter 2). The planned atrophy of the social state, culminating with the 1996 law on “Work and Personal Responsibility,” which replaces the right to “welfare” with the obligation of “workfare,” and the sudden hypertrophy of the penal state are two concurrent and complementary developments (Chapter 3). Each in its manner, they [which] respond, on the one side, to the forsaking of the Fordist wage-work compact and the Keynesian compromise in the middle of the 1970s, and, on the other side, to the crisis of the ghetto as a device for the sociospatial confinement of blacks in the wake of the Civil Rights Revolution and the wave of urban riots of the 1960s. Together, they ensnare the marginal populations of the metropolis in a carceralassistential net that aims either to render them “useful” by steering them onto the track of deskilled employment, or to warehouse them out of reach in the devastated core of the urban “Black Belt” or in the penitentiaries that have become the latter’s distant satellites.

Productivism outweighs, it’s impossible to reorient our values within this paradigm – everything becomes an object which means that they retrench the problems and prevent the AC’s revaluation. **Morgareidge 98**[[10]](#footnote-10)

To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. Under capitalism, Marx writes, everything in nature and everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or an obstacle to, the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money. For those who manage and live from capital, nothing has value of its own. Mountain streams, clean air, human lives -- all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they can be used to turn a profit. If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced. Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care, to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable. People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.

An effective strategy must reject employment as a site for emancipation. Realignment of values ends up being along governmental lines – turns case and means the perm can’t sole. **Barchiesi[[11]](#footnote-11)**

Taking aim at the centrality of work in the governmental norms of societies where jobs as such are the constitutive condition of precarity highlights two important political tasks. First, one has to recognize that employment-based understandings of emancipation have to be discarded as their recentering of desire around employment is indeed a uniquely effective enabler for authoritarian identifications and collective realignments along governmental rationality. Second, the precariousness of employment, rather than its idealized celebration, must be placed at the core of a new grammar of politics and representations into which the sociology of work and technocratic policymaking modalities of conflict, which can counteract the socially pathologizing representations into which the sociology of work and technocratic policymaking have cast precarity.

## Levinas NB

### 1. Totalization

The living wage uniquely mandates a conception of the good life for all agents –

**A. Contracting:** Aff defines the conditions of fair contract – reinforces the government conception as an absolute constraint on individuals and enforces a definition of exploitation for them that stops them from doing what they want to based whether it’s acceptable to the government.

**B.** **Life Requirements:** A living wage identifies necessity, security and comfort for the other universally when these are subjective considerations. Employees don’t get to decide what comforts are essential to their lives, they are made to allow the government to do so.

Counterplan doesn’t link – the government is free to develop its conception of the good life, it just can’t impose it on other agents. You can take the basic income or not, whereas wage requirements restrict what you can do.

My impact outweighs: nothing can justify or outweigh totalization impacts because it’s a condition of your engagement with the other. **Beavers[[12]](#footnote-12)**

If we can accept this notion that ideas are inventions of the mind, that ideas are, when it comes down to it, only interpretations of something, and if ethics, in fact, is taken to refer to real other persons who exist apart from my interpretations, then we are up against a problem: there is no way in which ideas, on the current model, refer to independently existing other persons, and as such, ideas cannot be used to found an ethics. There can be no pure practical reason until after contact with the other is established. Given this view towards ideas, then, anytime I take the person in my idea to be the real person, I have closed off contact with the real person; I have cut off the connection with the other that is necessary if ethics is to refer to real other people. This is a central violence to the other that denies the other his/her own autonomy. Levinas calls this violence "totalization" and it occurs whenever I limit the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, sexual, or otherwise. Indeed, it occurs whenever I already know what the other is about before the other has spoken. That is, it is the inscription of the other in the same. If ethics presupposes the real other person, then such totalization will, in itself, be unethical.

### 2. Codification

Making obligations into a concrete set of rules is inconsistent with the standard:

**A. Resposnsibility:** when you follow a rule it’s for its own sake, you don't do it for the Other, and so it effaces then - you're not responding to their alterity. The rule mandates your action, so you're acting either out of some intrinsic value placed on obedience or fear of legal sanction, which is self interested, not transcending the ego. **B. Specificity**: A general rule means that you don’t account for the specificity of the Other. Also links into the totalization weighing since you’re categorizing instead of responding to the specificity of the Other. **Corvellec[[13]](#footnote-13)**

A managerial ethics of Levinasian inspiration could likewise only be local and contingent, i.e. modest. As Zigmunt Bauman (1993) observes, the ethics of Levinas implies the reject of an idea of universal moral norms. A Levinasian moral project, can thus only be local in the sense of being part of a here and now from which it cannot be disentangled. For a manager, this implies that each acting has to be approached in function of the specific traits of the situation at stake. This is not restating plainly the relativism of morality, in particular as opposed to the generality of ethics. It is instead highlighting that responsibility is a matter of refusal and avoidance of generalisation and a corresponding awareness of and adaptation to the specificity of any here and now since this specificity is constitutive of the alterity present in the relationship to the Other. Managers need to be warned against the risk that disembodying, typifying or generalising approaches of the other represent for otherness. Otherness is not an intellectual abstraction but a concrete reality – and reality is uniquely here and now. This is epitomised by the face-to face: every face-to-face is unique as every face and every ‘to’ – the standing in front of the other in the face-to-face – is unique. Acknowledging the unique here and now concrete character of an encounter is not being relativistic; it is being aware that the occasional is the condition of our stumbling upon alterity. ‘Beware of generalisation’ (or for that matter: categorisation, typification, definition and the like) should stand on the pediment of all companies or the desk of all managers if we are to take seriously the demise of the (moral) grand narratives of modernity. Yet, how often does one hear the recommendation of adopting a local and contingent modesty in undergraduate, graduate or MBA programs?

**C. Limitation:** codifying your responsibility into a strict rule limits your obligation to that mandate and enforces it regardless of the specific nature of your relation to the other. That's inconsistent with obligations stemming from the face of the Other, since the way you respond is already determined for you and limited by categories present in your experience but not necessarily theirs. Thus, a mandatory framework doesn’t leave room for real responsibility. **Mansell[[14]](#footnote-14)**

The more flexible a set of rules can be, such as the voluntary codes and principles used by business, the more chance will exist for aligning these rules with a sense of responsibility for the Other. This requirement for flexibility is explained by Levinas’s argument that our responsibility for the Other can never be set along one fixed dimension. So, paradoxically perhaps, whilst the sort of ethical codes used by business can serve as an escape from real responsibility, they can at the same time (through their flexible and voluntary nature) offer the possibility for a degree of alignment with responsibility that a mandatory framework cannot capture. Directors have, under the UK Combined Code of 2003 (which I mention only as an example) the choice to comply with the principles in the code, or explain why they have deviated from them. Likewise, an employee who is supposedly subject to the ‘ethical code’ of the business will almost always have room for a flexible interpretation of what this means in any given context, and be able to apply what Aristotle (1980) calls ‘practical wisdom’. There is a chance that in the space left open by this flexibility, principles can be adhered to that do reflect a genuine openness of responsibility.

Counterplan allows that flexibility and solves the case. It means that corporations must pay people more, but does so without a mandate. **Yglesias ‘13[[15]](#footnote-15)**

A GBI helps people by giving them money, obviously. It also serves as a kind of de facto minimum wage, since if people can earn money doing nothing, in practice you're going to need to offer them higher pay to get them to work. But it's much more flexible than a minimum wage. In a GBI world, an employer has to make work somehow appealing enough to get employees even though everyone's guaranteed a basic minimum whether they work or not. But that "appealing" factor could be high wages, could be valuable skills and training, could just be a pleasant work atmosphere, or could be some combination of the three. Current minimum wage policies sort of try to achieve these goals by having exemptions for educationally rewarding internships or vocational programs. But these exemptions manage to be simultaneously too prone to abuse and too inflexible to capture the full range of possible scenarios that arise in human life.

# Frontlines

## AT Turns

### AT Not Enough Money/You Give People Money and Take It Right Back:

1. Governments easily have enough money for UBI since UBI replaces all other welfare programs. **Vinik 13**[[16]](#footnote-16)**:**

But a [basic] minimum income would also allow us to eliminate every government benefit as well. Get rid of SNAP, TANF, housing vouchers, the Earned Income tax credit and many others. Get rid of them all. A 2012 Congressional Research Service report found that the federal government spends approximately $750 billion each year on benefits for low-income Americans and that rises to a clean trillion [with]when you factor in state programs. Eliminate all of those and the net figure comes out to $1.2 trillion needed to pay for a universal basic income, still a hefty sum. That doesn’t mean there aren’t ways to pay for it. The CBO found that a carbon tax would bring in nearly $100 billion a year for instance. Revenue would also increase automatically since everyone would have a basic income on which to pay taxes. The government could also offer a basic income of $6,000 a year instead of up to the poverty line. Funding a basic income for all working-age adults would not be easy and would require a substantial increase in the size of government, but it's not impossible either.

### AT People Don’t Work:

1. Turn: Not only is this effect negligible, but the few people who do stop working do so for really good reasons – Canada proves. **Belik[[17]](#footnote-17) 11**

Try to imagine a town where the government paid each of the residents a living income, regardless of who they were and what they did, and a Soviet hamlet in the early 1980s may come to mind. But this experiment happened much closer to home. For a four-year period in the '70s, the poorest families in Dauphin, Manitoba, were granted a guaranteed minimum income by the federal and provincial governments. Thirty-five years later all that remains of the experiment are 2,000 boxes of documents that have gathered dust in the Canadian archives building in Winnipeg. Until now little has been known about what unfolded over those four years in the small rural town, since the government locked away the data that had been collected and prevented it from being analyzed. But after a five year struggle, Evelyn Forget, a professor of health sciences at the University of Manitoba, secured access to those boxes in 2009. Until the data is computerized, any systematic analysis is impossible. Undeterred, Forget has begun to piece together the story by using the census, health records, and the testimony of the program's participants. What is now emerging reveals that the program could have counted many successes. Beginning in 1974, Pierre Trudeau's Liberals and Manitoba's first elected New Democratic Party government gave money to every person and family in Dauphin who fell below the poverty line. Under the program—called “Mincome”—about 1,000 families received monthly cheques. Unlike welfare, which only certain individuals qualified for, the guaranteed minimum income project was open to everyone. It was the first—and to this day, only—time that Canada has ever experimented with suan open-door social assistance program. In today’s conservative political climate, with constant government and media rhetoric about the inefficiency and wastefulness of the welfare state, the Mincome project sounds like nothing short of a fairy tale. For four years Dauphin was a place where anyone living below the poverty line could receive monthly cheques to boost their income, no questions asked. Single mothers could afford to put their kids through school and low-income families weren't scrambling to pay the rent each month. For Amy Richardson, it meant she could afford to buy her children books for school. Richardson joined the program in 1977, just after her husband had gone on disability leave from his job. At the time, she was struggling to raise her three youngest children on $1.50 haircuts she gave in her living room beauty parlour. The $1,200 per year she received in monthly increments was a welcome supplement, in a time when the poverty line was $2,100 a year. “The extra money meant that I was also able to give my kids something I wouldn't ordinarily be able to, like taking them to a show or some small luxury like that,” said Richardson, now 84, who spoke to The Dominion by phone from Dauphin. As part of the experiment, an army of researchers were sent to Dauphin to interview the Mincome families. Residents in nearby rural towns who didn't receive Mincome were also surveyed so their statistics could be compared against those from Dauphin. But after the government cut the program in 1978, they simply warehoused the data and never bothered to analyze it. “When the government introduced the program they really thought it would be a pilot project and that by the end of the decade they would roll this out and everybody would participate,” said Forget. “They thought it would become a universal program. But of course, the idea eventually just died off.” During the Mincome program, the federal and provincial governments collectively spent $17 million, though it was initially supposed to have cost only a few million. Meant to last several more years, the program came to a quick halt in 1978 when an economic recession hit Canada. The recession had caused prices to increase 10 per cent each year, so payouts to families under Mincome had increased accordingly. Trudeau's Liberals, already on the defensive for an overhaul of Canada's employment insurance system, killed the program and withheld any additional money to analyze the data that had been amassed. “It's hugely unfortunate and typical of the strange ways in which government works that the data was never analyzed,” says Ron Hikel who coordinated the Mincome program. Hikel now works in the United States to promote universal healthcare reform. “Government officials opposed [to Mincome] didn't want to spend more money to analyze the data and show what they already thought: that it didn't work,” says Hikel, who remains a strong proponent of guaranteed income programs. “And the people who were in favour of Mincome were worried because if the analysis was done and the data wasn't favourable then they would have just spent another million dollars on analysis and be even more embarrassed.” But Forget[‘s] has culled some useful info from Manitoba labour data. Her research confirms numerous positive consequences of the program. Initially, the Mincome program was conceived as a labour market experiment. The government wanted to know what would happen if everybody in town received a guaranteed income, and specifically, they wanted to know whether people would still work. It turns out they did.Only two segments of Dauphin's labour force worked less as a result of Mincome—new mothers and teenagers. Mothers with newborns stopped working because they wanted to stay at home longer with their babies. And teenagers worked less because they weren't under as much pressure to support their families. The end result was that they spent more time at school and more teenagers graduated. Those who continued to work were given more opportunities to choose what type of work they did.

1. UBI provides just enough money to meet the bare necessities, so they’d obviously want to work to have a decent quality life. **Janzen[[18]](#footnote-18) 11:**

Now, the first thing to address is will people work? Well, there may be a portion of people that don't work under this system. They may be housewives/househusbands, elderly, students and of course we will have the people who are very satisfied with $10,000/yr [but]. The fact is that we already have all these people in society and, in a large part, we have to pay for them through social programs like welfare. The cost to us for each person actually exceeds $10,000/yr because we also have to pay for the bureaucratic institutions that administer these programs. I do not think that a basic income will change human nature. What it will do is provide opportunities for people to leave their dead-end soul-destroying jobs that they are keeping just to make ends meet. These people could then get re-educated or start their own business in a field where they will be more productive. This leads me to answer the next question about how to eliminate the welfare trap. Right now, being on welfare is stigmatized and frowned upon, under a basic income, everyone receives the payment so it removes the stigma of taking "handouts" from the government. Also, right now a person who collects welfare will have their payments cutback once they find a job. After taxes have been assessed, a person earning minimum wage will have less money per year than a person receiving welfare, thus the incentive is to not work. Under a basic income, each dollar made through work will improve your situation, so there actually is a greater incentive to work under this system.

3. Cross-apply **Yglesias**. That talks about how people *will* work since in order to stay in business, employers have to make work appealing with higher wages and benefits. The CP coopts the benefits of the aff without needing to even do the aff. If we do the CP, we get the benefits of both. This also means no net benefit to the perm since the CP solves better and causes the benefits of the aff to happen.

### AT Not Empirically Proven/Doesn’t Solve

Empirics show that the CP solves health issues as well as poverty. **CBC 10’[[19]](#footnote-19):**

From 1974 [to] through 1978, about 30 per cent of the population of Dauphin [, Manitoba] was [given]provided with a "mincome," as the guaranteed level of [basic] income came to be called. "We found that, overall, hospitalizations in Dauphin declined relative to the control group," said Evelyn Forget, professor of community health science at the University of Manitoba. "We also looked at accidents and injuries, and they also declined. You can argue that accident and injury hospitalizations are strongly related to poverty." The goal of the program, which cost $17 million, was to find out whether a guaranteed income would improve health and community life. If a household's income dropped below a certain amount, the program would top it up to an income equivalent to the welfare rates at the time. The participants who worked had their supplement reduced 50 cents for every dollar they earned in an attempt to encourage people in the program to look for work. Forget has spent three years comparing the administrative health care records of Dauphin's citizens between 1974 and 1978 with those of a control group of people living in similar Manitoba communities at that time. She said her research suggests that people appear to live healthier lives when they don't have to worry about poverty. "Hospitalizations for mental health issues were down significantly [and]," she said, adding that teenagers stayed in school longer as a result of the initiative. The initiative, which started in 1974, was terminated in 1978 as political support for the experiment faded. "Politically, there was a concern that if you began a guaranteed annual income, people would stop working and start having large families," Forget said. Ron Hikel, the executive director of the Mincome project, is delighted Forget is taking a fresh look at the project's impact. "As somebody who devoted three or four years of his life to making this happen, I was disappointed that the data were warehoused," Hikel said. Forget has not yet been given access to the 2,000 boxes of data collected by the original Mincome researchers, which contain copies of questionnaires participants filled out and, she believes, transcripts of interviews with the families who took part. Hikel, who is now legislative director for U.S. Rep. Eric Massa, said Forget's research is immensely relevant in Canada and the United States. He said he intends to use her analysis as part of the current health-care debate. "It has to do with the impact that larger social conditions have on one's health condition and the need for health care," Hikel said.

### AT Its Sexist:

1. UBI is a way to guarantee that both genders have unconditionally equal pay. **McKay[[20]](#footnote-20):**

A citizens' basic income scheme is based on the principles of individuality, universality, and unconditionality; when combined with the notion of meeting "basic needs" it would serve to provide a minimum income guarantee for all adult members of society. However, implementation would entail radical reform of existing patterns of welfare delivery and would bring into question the institutionalized relationship between work and welfare, a basic premise of modern welfare states. To date, the debate over a citizens' basic income has emphasized its effects on labor markets, thereby displaying an androcentric bias. Although the role of women in society is central to social policy reform, the existing basic income literature is disturbingly void of any comprehensive treatment of women. No genuine discussion has taken place about the nature of women's lives and work and how these should be valued. Social policy reform should take account of all gender inequalities and not just those relating to the traditional labor market. This paper argues that the citizens' basic income model can be a tool for promoting gender-neutral social citizenship rights, but that any future marriage of justice and efficiency must first divorce work from income.

2. Since the UBI has been established at a certain amount, the government can’t just decide not to give some people something that has “universal” in the name.

### AT It Worsens Stigma For The Poor:

This argument is ridiculous – obviously a plan to alleviate poverty is going to make people more sympathetic. Plus, a living wage is worse on this issue because it makes the poor prove that they’re “worthy”. **Anderssen[[21]](#footnote-21) 10:**

But a guaranteed-annual-income program would be expensive. In developing nations, a small amount of money can bring about big changes. In a country like Canada, the basic income needed to pull everyone out of poverty would have to be larger, balanced against higher taxes. "We'd probably have to settle for something much less generous," says Guy Lacroix, an economist at the University of Laval. "And is that better than what we already have?" His cost analysis of the Quebec proposal estimated it could run the province as much as $2-billion, including the cost in lost taxes if minimum-wage workers did the math and left those jobs. Other experts argue that poverty reduction needs to be tailored to individual circumstances, especially in cases involving mental health and addiction. But many of those arguments are already made about our current welfare system, with all its costly and often overlapping bureaucracies. It's not efficient to have case workers deciding whether someone merits assistance for a new bed because their low-rent basement apartment has flooded. And governments have struggled for years to solve the problem of the "welfare wall," the point at which working a minimum-wage job is less beneficial and secure than collecting a cheque by staying home. Conservative Senator Hugh Segal, one of the more vocal proponents of no-strings-attached aid for the poor, points out that the guaranteed-income program for seniors has greatly reduced poverty, especially among women. "There's a bias that when given the chance people will be lazy," he says. "That's not my sense of reality." Mr. Segal argues that giving money with no conditions removes the stigma and shame around poverty, allowing people to focus instead on how to improve their lot. Requiring the poor to prove continually that they are deserving of assistance or threatening to pull help away without notice only discourages the risk-taking and confidence required to get out of poverty. "It's dehumanizing," Mr. Segal says. "Think of a mother having to negotiate though Plexiglas for enough money to feed her family." Or the mom who goes back to school to improve her prospects and loses her welfare payments because she is not seeking jobs.

### AT Inflation:

No it won’t. **Hiebert[[22]](#footnote-22) 14:**

If we're changing the distribution of the money that's already circulating in our economy, there's no reason the overall inflation rate should change. Might prices for housing or food increase in poor neighborhoods that faced a sudden increase in income? Possibly. But the poor often face higher prices anyway because of a lack of options in poor neighborhoods. An influx of money should bring in more competition, which should in turn lower prices. But again, the portable nature of a basic income [ubi] compared to other benefits for the poor allows people to move to places where expenses are lower. We should be more concerned about the inflationary effect of tax incentives for owner-occupied housing on housing prices in the U.S. than on a comparatively meager cash benefit.

## AT Perms

### AT UBI For Unemployed:

Universality is net preferable to unemployed targets – it a) avoids moral hazard and b) is much more cost effective. **Fabre[[23]](#footnote-23) et al 14:**

In this paper, we provide a quantitative comparison of an optimal universal basic income policy and an optimal unemployment insurance program in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks. While an unemployment insurance program is better equipped to respond to employment shocks, it suffers from moral hazard and is costly to manage. Monitoring costs are not trivial and add to the social cost of administering the policy. So does moral hazard, by allowing a fraction of agents to abuse the unemployment insurance program. A universal basic income policy, however, has no such social costs and is very simple to manage. We test the conjecture that a universal basic income may, under moral hazard and in the presence of monitoring costs, perform better. We conduct a wide variety of experiments and compare the social desirability of these policies. Our results show that an optimal UBI is feasible. Nevertheless, the UI policy is socially robust to the introduction of UBI in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. It takes empirically implausible monitoring costs and shirking success probabilities for the optimal basic income policy to dominate in terms of welfare the unemployment insurance policy in the economy calibrated to the 2011 United States labor market. With idiosyncratic shocks of smaller amplitude (such as those characterizing the 1990 US labor market dynamics), UBI may represent a more reasonable alternative, even if the UI policy remains socially preferred.

Meta analyses prove that non-targeted welfare programs are always more effective due to the cooperation from the wealthy. **Harrop[[24]](#footnote-24) 12:**

Figure 2 is striking and highly counterintuitive. It shows that on average the amount redistributed to the poor actually decreases as welfare states become[s] more targeted. Any increase in redistribution from an increase in targeting is clearly outweighed by the smaller expenditure that is associated with the lower willingness to pay of targeted welfare states. This confirms the hypothesis that strategies of targeting result[s] in welfare states that do less redistribution to the poorest than strategies of universalism. Figure 3 shows the corollary of this: the amount of redistribution done by welfare states is strongly correlated with their generosity. In redistributive terms, the inefficiency of universal systems tends to be outweighed by the higher expenditure that results from their greater popularity. This comparative analysis helps to explain[s] what political scientists Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme (1998) have called the ‘paradox of redistribution’: ‘the more we target benefits at the poor only, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality’. At the level of welfare states, it explains why those which are oriented specifically towards poverty alleviation (and therefore targeted) tend to end up with lots of poverty, while those which encompass middle and higher income households tend to have much less poverty. More generous systems offer entitlements which are genuinely attractive for middle-class households, creating sustained willingness to pay in.

### AT Do Both:

1. They are mutually exclusive. The CP text says “abolish the minimum wage”.

2. Combining the two would be too expensive, but the CP is within budget while the aff isn’t.

3. Also, no net benefit to the perm since the CP solves for unemployed and employed people, while the aff does a worse job solving for only the employed people.

1. Aziz, John [Economics and Business Correspondent @ The Week, Associate Editor at Pieria. Previous: Business Insider, Zero Hedge.],“There is a better alternative to raising the minimum wage” (Dec 6, 2013) < http://theweek.com/article/index/253795/there-is-a-better-alternative-to-raising-the-minimum-wage > [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Yglesias, Matthew [executive editor of Vox and author of The Rent Is Too Damn High], “EITC Isn't The Alternative to a Minimum Wage, This Is” (2013)

   < slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/02/17/guaranteed\_basic\_income\_the\_real\_alternative\_to\_the\_minimum\_wage.html > [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Why Raising the Minimum Wage Kills Jobs, William Dunkelberg (writer for Forbes, Chief Economist for the National Federation of Independent Business and Professor Emeritus at Temple University), Dec. 2012, Forbes.com [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Rotman, David [editor of MIT Technology Review]. "How technology is destroying jobs." MIT Technology Review (2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Thomas Rodham Wells [Lectures in business ethics and the philosophy of social science at the Faculty of Economics and Business of the University of Groningen. background in philosophy at the University of Durham in the UK (BA & MA) followed by an MA and PhD in philosophy and economics at the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics in Rotterdam], “The Robot Economy and the Crisis of Capitalism: Why We Need Universal Basic Income” (May 12, 2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Boeri 08 Tito Boeri (Italian economist, currently professor of economics at Bocconi University, Milan ) and Jan van Ours (Professor of Labor Economics, Tilburg University). “The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets.” Princeton University Press, 2008 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Diana Farrell. “The hidden dangers of the informal economy.” McKinsey Quarterly, July 2004 AJ [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Morini, Cristina [journalist and independent researcher, graduated with a degree in Political Studies from the State University of Milano], Andrea Fumagalli [Professor of economics in the Department of Economics and Management at University of Pavia]. "The Precarity-Trap and Basic Income: the Labour Market in Cognitive Bio-capitalism. The Italian Case." relazione presentata al IX Convegno internazionale di Historical Materialism, Soas, Londra (2012): 8-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Loic Wacquant [Sociologist, University of California, Berkeley] “PUNISHING THE POOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY” 2006 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Morgaridge, Clayton, Prof of Philosophy at Lewis & Clark College, 1998, Why Capitalism is Evil 08/22 http://www.lclark.edu/~clayton/commentaries/evil.html [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Barchiesi, Franco [Sheila Biddle Ford Foundation Fellow at the W.E.B. Du Bois Research Institute at Harvard, Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies Program Faculty at Ohio State]. "Against Job Creation. Precarious Work as a Challenge to Employment-Centered Normativity in Postcolonial Africa." (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Beavers, Anthony. "Introducing Levinas to undergraduate philosophers." Colloquy paper, Undergraduate Philosophy Association, University of Texas. Austin (1990). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Corvellec, Hervé. "An Endless Responsibility for Justice: For a Levinasian Approach to Managerial Ethics." Levinas, Business Ethics (2005): 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Mansell, Samuel. "Proximity and Rationalisation: Reflections on the Limits of a Levinasian Ethics in the context of Corporate Governance." [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Yglesias, Matthew [executive editor of Vox and author of The Rent Is Too Damn High], “EITC Isn't The Alternative to a Minimum Wage, This Is” (2013)

    < slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/02/17/guaranteed\_basic\_income\_the\_real\_alternative\_to\_the\_minimum\_wage.html > [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. “Everyone's Talking About This Simple Solution To Ending Poverty By Just Giving People Free Money”, Danny Vinik, Nov. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Vivian Belik, *A Town Without Poverty*, *The Dominion,* September 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Scott Janzen, *Basic Income Guarantee (Ted Talk)*, October 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. “1970s' Manitoba poverty experiment called a success”, CBC News, Mar. 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. “Rethinking Work and Income Maintenance Policy: Promoting Gender Equality Through a Citizens' Basic Income”, Alisa McKay, Jan. 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Erin Anderssen, To end poverty, guarantee everyone in Canada $20,000 a year. But are you willing to trust the poor?, The Globe and Mail. Nov. 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Paul Hiebert, *UBI: Something We Can All Agree On?*, Pacific Standard. June 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Alice Fabre et al (Research Division Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper Series), *Universal Basic Income Versus Unemployment insurance*, November 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Andrew Harrop, *The Coalition and Universalism*, *Fabian Society,* 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)